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THE SUPREME COURT’S STEALTH RETURN TO THE
COMMON LAW OF TORTS
John C.P. Goldberg* & Benjamin C. Zipursky**
INTRODUCTION
Although it now enjoys a hallowed place in our legal history, Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins1 began as a plain-vanilla negligence case.
Tompkins was struck by Erie’s train while he was walking on a worn
path alongside tracks near his Pennsylvania home.  Because the path
was on Erie’s right of way, Tompkins’ lawyers feared that Penn-
sylvania state and federal courts would follow Pennsylvania prece-
dents and rule that Tompkins was a trespasser to whom Erie owed no
duty of care.  Hoping to take advantage of Swift v. Tyson’s directive
that federal courts should interpret “general law” according to “gen-
eral reasoning and legal analogies,” even if that meant departing from
state court precedents,2 Tompkins filed suit in federal district court in
New York.3
Tompkins’ gambit initially worked.  The district court declined to
dismiss his suit, and a jury found in his favor.4  The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, taking the occasion to for-
mulate a more plaintiff-friendly rule of general tort law than its coun-
terpart in Pennsylvania law: “Where the public has made open and
notorious use of a railroad right of way for a long period of time and
without objection, the company owes to persons on such permissive
pathway a duty of care in the operation of its trains.”5
Unfortunately and ironically for Tompkins—ironically because
Swift had been mostly criticized for allowing corporate defendants to
* Eli Goldston Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
** James H. Quinn ’49 Professor of Legal Ethics, Fordham University School of Law.
Thanks to John Manning and Mark Tushnet for very helpful comments.  Thanks also to Harvard
Law School and Fordham University School of Law for generously supporting our research.
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  Our description of the Erie litigation relies on Edward Purcell’s excel-
lent account.  Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Story of Erie: How Litigants, Lawyers, Judges, Politics,
and Social Change Reshape the Law, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 21, 36–49 (Kevin M. Cler-
mont ed., 2d ed. 2008).
2. 41 U.S. 1 (1842), overruled by Erie, 304 U.S. 64.
3. Erie, 304 U.S. at 67.  New York was Erie’s state of incorporation.
4. Id. at 70.
5. Tompkins v. Erie R.R. Co., 90 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1937), rev’d, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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remove diversity cases to take advantage of defendant-friendly rules
of general law6— the Supreme Court reversed.  Writing for a major-
ity, Justice Brandeis declared unsound Swift’s assertion that federal
courts enjoy a power to fashion general law.  Going forward, suits
such as Tompkins’ would be governed by substantive state law.  Pre-
dictably, after it was remanded for adjudication under Pennsylvania
tort law, Tompkins’ suit was dismissed.
For those inclined to view the Court as primarily a political actor,
Erie might seem puzzling.  After all, its rejection of Swift was an act of
self-disempowerment.  The Court had conferred on itself a privileged
position to shape contract, property, and tort law. Erie abandoned
that position.  Moreover, it did so at a moment of increasing economic
nationalization in which there was a growing demand for uniform na-
tional laws.  It is possible that the Court’s renunciation was a shrewd
bit of institutional self-preservation—one move in the strategic retreat
famously dubbed the “switch in time.”7  More likely, the Erie majority
believed it was doing the right thing—that the balance of constitu-
tional, jurisprudential, and political reasons favored the federal courts
getting out of the business of making general common law.  Perhaps
the Justices also believed that they were ceding a power that was rela-
tively circumscribed (after all, under Swift, the Court could not force
state courts to follow its interpretations of the general law) and that
was destined to become more circumscribed in a world that would be
increasingly governed by legislation and regulation.
Erie’s holding has since been refined in many ways, generating
lively debates over its proper interpretation.8  These debates aside, the
decision clearly matters at a practical level.  Manufacturers, for exam-
ple, have since needed to comply with the negligence, warranty, and
products liability laws of all U.S. jurisdictions.  Variations among the
states’ tort doctrines are felt even by actors whose conduct is typically
governed by the laws of only one jurisdiction, such as physicians fac-
ing malpractice liability.  This is why lobbyists for defendants and in-
surers have regularly sought tort reform at the congressional level,
although so far without much success.
At the same time, it would be an enormous mistake to equate Erie’s
disavowal of general law with a withdrawal by the Supreme Court
6. See Purcell, supra note 1, at 27, 48. R
7. BURT SOLOMON, FDR V. THE CONSTITUTION: THE COURT-PACKING FIGHT AND THE TRI-
UMPH OF DEMOCRACY 162 (2009) (noting uncertainty as to who first coined the “switch in time”
phrase).
8. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE
JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA 285–308 (2000) (discussing late twentieth-century debates over Erie).
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from tort law.  After Erie, one does not find in the U.S. Reports pre-
cise counterparts to the Holmes–Cardozo, Goodman–Pokora in-
terchange over the proper approach to contributory negligence in
railroad grade-crossing accidents.9  Nonetheless, by the mid-1960s, the
Court was actively making tort law, both directly and indirectly. In
American tort law today, the Supreme Court is a major player.
To the extent commentators have underappreciated this develop-
ment, it is in part because the Court’s interventions have occurred on
various fronts and taken various forms.  Through interpretations of
the federal Constitution and federal statutes, the Court has recognized
(but also limited the scope of) new torts.  These include Bivens ac-
tions,10 Title VII claims for hostile work environment discrimination,11
and securities fraud claims.12  Through its interpretation of other stat-
utes, such as the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA)13 and the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),14 the Court has influenced state law
on issues such as liability for medical monitoring,15 and it has pre-
served and arguably expanded sovereign immunity.16  In applying and
interpreting procedural and evidentiary rules, the Justices have dra-
matically curtailed the use of class actions to resolve mass torts17 and
have required plaintiffs to meet relatively demanding evidentiary re-
quirements on issues such as design defect in products liability cases
9. Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927) (Holmes, J.)  (suggesting a rule
under which drivers at certain grade crossings who fail to stop, look, and reconnoiter would be
deemed contributorily negligent for ensuing collisions); Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98
(1934) (Cardozo, J.)  (rejecting Goodman’s suggested rule as artificial and insufficiently respon-
sive to the facts of individual cases).
10. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971) (recognizing an implied right of action for violations of Fourth Amendment rights).
11. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (holding that severe emotional
distress is not an element of a hostile work environment claim); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (defining the elements of a hostile work environment claim).
12. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (recognizing fraud on the market as a
viable theory of securities fraud); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (defining the
elements of securities fraud claims brought under federal statutes and regulations).
13. Act of Apr. 22, 1908, ch. 149, as amended by Act of Apr. 5, 1910, ch. 145, 35 Stat. 65
(codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2012)).
14. Ch. 753, §§ 401–24, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
15. See, e.g., Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S 424 (1997) (permitting
claims for medical monitoring under FELA).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991) (interpreting the FTCA’s discre-
tionary function exception); Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
17. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999) (denying certification of a settle-
ment class based on a “limited fund” theory); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591
(1997) (affirming denial of class certification for failure to meet the criteria of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23).
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and causation in toxic tort cases.18  Finally, and most dramatically,
through its interpretations of the First Amendment, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Supremacy Clause, respectively, the Court has
transformed defamation law,19 has set significant limits on punitive
damages,20 and has deemed entire domains of products liability law
preempted.21
We do not mean to suggest that, merely by getting involved in the
matters just described, the Court has flouted Erie or otherwise acted
inappropriately.  Certainly none of these interventions rest on an ex-
plicit claim by the Court to enjoy a Swift-like power to fashion general
law.  Rather, each has been rooted in an interpretation and applica-
tion of a federal statute or the federal Constitution.  Yet, while the
Court has hewed to the letter of Erie, it has increasingly lost touch
with the notions of common law and federalism that seemed to ani-
mate that decision.
Erie was fueled by the idea that Swift had given the federal courts
an inappropriate role within our federal system by providing a forum
through which repeat-player tort defendants could seek, and often
find, more favorable treatment than they tended to receive under
state law.  The federal courts were available to play this role partly
because the political and legal leanings of the federal judiciary tended
to diverge from those of state court judges and juries, and also be-
cause they gave sophisticated defense lawyers a chance to make argu-
ments that tended to fare worse in state court. Erie called on the
federal courts to respect the state courts as the authentic font of com-
mon law doctrine.  Yet, the modern Court has increasingly allowed
itself (and lower federal courts) to become a shadow lawmaker that
provides relief to tort defendants dissatisfied with outcomes in state
courts.  Worse, it has done so not merely by giving relief to defendants
who can find their way to federal court through removal but, instead,
by fashioning law that is binding in courts throughout the United
States.
18. See, e.g., Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (holding that the Daubert
standard applies to all forms of expert testimony); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509
U.S. 579 (1993) (interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence as requiring district courts to assess
the validity of methods deployed by expert witnesses).
19. See infra notes 24–49 and accompanying text (discussing defamation decisions). R
20. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007) (identifying due process
limits on the considerations jurors may take into account when awarding punitive damages);
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (establishing due process guidelines for the
size of punitive damage awards); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (defining
due process requirements for judicial review of punitive damage awards).
21. See infra notes 52, 108 and accompanying text (discussing preemption decisions).
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Although we believe that there are many examples of this phenom-
enon, this Article focuses on two.  Part II examines New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan,22 the Court’s first great post-Erie foray into tort law.
Sullivan is, of course, the starting point, but we follow the Court’s ef-
forts all the way to its recent decision in Snyder v. Phelps.23  In Part
III, we consider the Court’s burgeoning preemption decisions, which,
given their massive curtailment of liability for product-related injuries,
raise particularly urgent issues of legitimacy.
It is not surprising that the Supreme Court has found its way back
into tort law.  Tort law is not simply a local, small-stakes dispute reso-
lution system for injured plaintiffs.  Like criminal law and constitu-
tional law, tort law is central in the operation of our legal system.
Thus, on one level, it is entirely plausible that our top court should
have something to say about it.  Still, the Court’s participation must be
carefully examined to ensure that it is operating within the letter and
the spirit of Erie’s self-imposed restraints.
II. DEFAMATION, PRIVACY, AND INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS: FROM SULLIVAN TO GERTZ AND BEYOND
The modern Supreme Court’s deepest and most widely accepted
foray into tort law began in 1964 with Sullivan.  For many reasons,
Sullivan is not often associated with tort reform.  Issued more than a
decade before the initial wave of liability insurance ‘crises’ that gave
rise to the modern tort reform movement, it was and is emblematic of
the Warren Court’s political progressivism.  Moreover, the decision so
plainly addresses a question of free speech that its constitutional com-
ponent understandably obscures its tort component.  Also, tort law
tends these days to be (wrongly) thought of as accident law, and Sulli-
van has nothing to do with accidents.  Beyond all these there is a more
basic reason that the decision is not associated with tort law.  How-
ever, we must delve further into the decision to appreciate this reason.
It is difficult to think of a more compelling case than Sullivan for
Supreme Court intervention on behalf of a tort defendant.  In the
mid-1960s, the Court was a leader in the movement to end de jure
segregation.  The national media, based in New York and Washington,
D.C., was a powerful ally in that movement, and Martin Luther King,
Jr. was its most prophetic figure.  City Commissioner L.B. Sullivan’s
libel suit was a direct attack on the national media and an indirect
22. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
23. 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
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attack on King.24  The Alabama Supreme Court effectively endorsed
that attack by: (1) stretching state tort law to hold the New York
Times liable for publishing an advertisement that nowhere mentioned
Sullivan or his office; (2) permitting compensatory damages with no
evidence of actual harm; and (3) allowing punitive damages with little
or no evidence of common law malice.  It was thus hardly surprising
that the Justices granted the newspaper’s petition, ordered the dismis-
sal of the lawsuit, and abandoned prior dictum asserting that defama-
tory speech is categorically unprotected.25
Sullivan presented such a strong case for recognition of First
Amendment limits on ‘tort’ liability because it was a criminal prosecu-
tion dressed up as a civil defamation action.  While putatively suing in
his individual capacity, the plaintiff was a Montgomery city official.
The supposedly libelous statements involved criticisms of abusive ac-
tions purportedly taken by city police against civil rights activists.26
Sullivan’s claim of redress for reputational harm was not colorable—
the obvious point of the suit was to obtain a punitive damages award
that would cause the national media to shrink from covering segrega-
tion.  In sum, this was a transparent effort by a government official,
aided by sympathetic state judges, to use civil litigation to punish a
newspaper for publishing criticisms of official actions and policies.
The Alabama Supreme Court’s affirmance of the plaintiff’s verdict
was a declaration that, when it came to critics of Jim Crow, the notori-
ous common law crime of seditious libel was alive and well.27
Once the underlying suit in Sullivan is seen for what it really was,
much about the Supreme Court’s decision comes more sharply into
focus.  First, one can appreciate why Herbert Wechsler’s famous brief
to the Court regarding the Alien and Sedition Acts resonated so
powerfully.28  Second, one can see why the Court was comfortable
dealing with a potentially knotty state-action issue by means of a con-
clusory footnote: this nominally private lawsuit really was state action.
Third, one readily appreciates the need for, and propriety of, the
Court’s intervention.  If anything raises First Amendment flags, it is
the criminalization of political speech.
24. See GENE ROBERTS & HANK KLIBANOFF, THE RACE BEAT: THE PRESS, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS STRUGGLE, AND THE AWAKENING OF A NATION 126–42 (2006) (providing an account of
Alabama’s efforts to stifle media coverage of civil rights issues).
25. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 292.
26. Id. at 256–59.  According to the suit, because Sullivan’s official responsibilities included
nominal oversight of the police department, readers of the offending advertisement might have
inferred that he had authorized or ratified the actions taken by police. Id.
27. See id. at 261–65.
28. Brief for the Petitioner at 40–49, Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (No. 39), 1963 WL 66441.
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These same features explain why Sullivan does not present itself as
a straightforward instance of tort reform.  Even though the decision
revised tort doctrine by imposing the actual malice requirement and
by narrowing the “of and concerning” element of the defamation torts
as applied to statements about official action, it did so as part of an
effort to set a boundary between tort and crime. Sullivan aimed to
ensure that civil defamation actions did not operate as criminal or
quasi-criminal proceedings, at least not without protections for de-
fendants that included a robust mens rea standard and an absolute bar
to punishment for speech about governmental actions in general, as
opposed to speech about misdeeds of particular named officials.
Of course, soon after Sullivan, the Court dove deeper into civil def-
amation law.  Some decisions expanded on Sullivan by making clear
that a finding of actual malice requires proof by clear and convincing
evidence of the defendant’s subjective awareness of falsity or reckless-
ness as to falsity.  The Court further held that this issue was a matter
of “constitutional fact,” which was subject to hard-look appellate re-
view.  In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,29 the Court extended the ac-
tual malice requirement to suits brought by public figures.30 More
dramatically, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,31 which was issued ten
years after Sullivan, the Court announced constitutional restrictions
applicable to defamation suits brought by private figures based on
speech addressing a matter of public concern.32  The Gertz majority
held that, without proof of carelessness as to the truth of the defama-
tory statement, there can be no liability for this type of speech and,
without proof of actual malice, there can be no presumed or punitive
damages.33  In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,34 the Court
picked up on Gertz’s offhand suggestion that “opinion” is constitu-
tionally protected,35 and ruled that a plaintiff must prove the falsity of
the defendant’s defamatory speech.36  Finally, although Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co.37 formally disavowed Gertz’s suggestion that ex-
pressions of opinion enjoy a separate constitutional immunity from
29. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
30. Id. at 160.  No doubt it helped that Curtis and its companion case involved suits by a
former government employee (a retired military officer) and a quasi-employee of a public uni-
versity (a football coach employed by an entity nominally separate from the university).  Unlike,
say, a film star, both of these public figures could be considered public officials.
31. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
32. Id. at 347–49.
33. Id.
34. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
35. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339–40.
36. Hepps, 475 U.S. at 775.
37. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
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liability, it nonetheless reemphasized the importance of proving fal-
sity.38  In doing so, it has encouraged lower courts to expand the do-
main of defamation claims that are dismissed on the ground that the
defendant’s statement amounts to a mere opinion containing no “fal-
sifiable” claim about the plaintiff.39
Prior to Sullivan, a plaintiff could win a libel suit by proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant published by writ-
ing or broadcast a defamatory statement about her to a third party.
Generally, there was no need for the plaintiff to prove that: (1) the
defendant was careless in making the statement (much less that she
was reckless); (2) the statement caused the plaintiff actual injury; and
(3) the statement was false.  Punitive damages were difficult to obtain
because the common law required willful or wanton misconduct, but a
plaintiff’s right to recover compensation for a damaged reputation was
ample.  There was no difference in the standards between cases in-
volving public figures and those involving private figures; the phrase
“public figure” was not part of the law of libel.
All of these features of the law of libel have changed dramatically
since Sullivan.  The requirement of proof of actual malice by clear and
convincing evidence has dramatically curtailed defamation suits by of-
ficials and public figures; private figures are rarely able to take advan-
tage of the common law doctrine of presumed damages and must now
prove at least negligence to have a chance of recovering compensatory
damages, assuming they can offer evidence of actual harm; and, a
wide range of statements are deemed nondefamatory on the ground
that they do not contain falsifiable or provably false statements.40  The
Court, of course, has asserted that its authority to make these changes
resides in the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.41  Still,
given the level of doctrinal detail at which the Court has operated, it is
hardly an exaggeration to assert that Sullivan and its progeny has pro-
duced a general law of libel.
Even this description understates Sullivan’s significance.  According
to Westlaw, in the decades since it was decided, courts have cited Sul-
livan 6,439 times.42  By comparison, they have cited Brown v. Board
38. Id. at 17–21.
39. See id.
40. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
41. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 3.
42. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan Citing Decisions, THOMPSON REUTERS: WESTLAWNEXT,
http://next.westlaw.com (search “376 U.S. 254”; then follow “Citing References” hyperlink; then
follow “Cases” hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 29, 2015).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-2\DPL215.txt unknown Seq: 9 15-JUL-16 11:15
2016] THE SUPREME COURT’S STEALTH RETURN 441
of Education 2,480 times.43 As we have noted, First Amendment-
based rulings by the Court that sprang from Sullivan have affected
cases that fall entirely outside the law of defamation.  Most notably,
the Court has invoked the First Amendment to drastically curtail the
tort of public disclosure of private facts.44  And, twice, in Hustler Mag-
azine, Inc. v. Falwell45 and then recently in Snyder, the Court has held
that the First Amendment limits liability for the intentional infliction
of emotional distress (IIED) claims through outrageous conduct.46
Given the magnitude of the changes wrought by the Court’s deci-
sions, it might seem surprising that there is not a more developed liter-
ature critical of its transformation of defamation, privacy, and IIED
law.  There are, however, structural reasons for this relative silence.
The law of defamation strikes many as resting on old-fashioned no-
tions of honor and was, in any event, in need of updating when the
Court decided to tackle it.  Moreover, it is no secret that Justices on
the left and right have each found much to like in expansive readings
of the First Amendment.  And, the media, which might otherwise
place some aspects of the Court’s jurisprudence under scrutiny, is
among the principal beneficiaries of this one-sidedness.
Nonetheless, during an era in which arguments grounded in federal-
ism are supposedly taken seriously, the virtual absence of any serious
criticism of the Court’s First Amendment torts decisions is startling.  If
ever there was a body of law that historically was the province of the
states and that gave a central role to local community values, it was
the law of defamation.  At moments—as in Sullivan—defamation liti-
gation has raised issues that must be resolved at a national level.  Per-
haps in the modern world of global media and costly litigation, any
plausible understanding of free speech would have significant implica-
tions for how defamation law is fashioned. Nonetheless, it remains re-
markable that an entire area of the common law of torts has been
remade by the Supreme Court, acting in the manner of a Court still in
the grips of Swift.
How did this transformation occur? A glib answer is “Gertz.”
There, a majority of the Court, based on reasoning very much akin to
Swift’s appeal to “general reasoning and legal analogies,” decided
that, in the modern world, all torts, including the defamation torts,
43. Brown v. Board of Education Citing Decisions, THOMPSON REUTERS: WESTLAWNEXT,
http://next.westlaw.com (search “347 U.S. 483”; then follow “Citing References” hyperlink; then
follow “Cases” hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 17, 2015).
44. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
45. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
46. See Snyder v. Phelps 562 U.S. 443, 459 (2011); Hustler, 485 U.S. at 50.
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ought to track the contours of the tort of negligence.47  Thus, it was
essential to all (or almost all) libel and slander claims that the plaintiff
prove the defendant’s fault and the tangible harm suffered.  Had the
Court limited its interventions to defamation suits involving public of-
ficials and public figures, Sullivan’s legacy would still be hugely impor-
tant, but it would not have amounted to a general law of defamation.
A longer answer is that Sullivan was written on terms that invited
this subsequent extension of constitutional doctrine.  For while the
case itself involved an effort to punish speech critical of government,
the Court’s key policy rationale—namely, the need to protect against
the chilling effect of tort liability on speech—has an unbounded qual-
ity to it, one that renders much of the law of defamation (and privacy
and IIED) incompatible with the First Amendment.
For this reason, Sullivan could not help but attract repeat-player
defendants and their well-trained, well-paid attorneys to push for
more protection against liability.  No countervailing concentrated in-
terests or professional expertise stood against them—defamation
plaintiffs were typically represented by personal injury lawyers with
no special expertise in that somewhat arcane body of law.  Combining
a tort-theoretic picture that equates tort law with negligence law and a
sophisticate’s skepticism about the small-minded moralism of com-
mon law libel, defense lawyers urged the Justices to see First Amend-
ment arguments all the way through to their (supposedly) policy-
driven conclusions.  This helps explain why, in Gertz, the Court de-
cided that an assumption of risk defense (which never featured in the
common law of defamation) defeats most claims by public figures48
while also deciding that, because all speech is valuable, strict liability
could not apply to any defamation claim, liability without proof of
actual injury is incoherent, and anything regarded as a statement of
opinion could not be deemed tortious.49
Regardless of whether the Supreme Court was correct to extend
Sullivan as far as it did, the ten-year arc from Sullivan to Gertz merits
scholarly focus.  It stands as an extraordinary example of how, not-
withstanding Erie, the Court can become so deeply involved in tort
cases that constitutional law displaces tort law.  The Court was first
lured into the area by a deeply troubling case that was entirely worthy
of its attention.  Because defendants qua petitioners had framed the
case to invite Court action, it identified a federal law problem at the
heart of an entire branch of tort law.  The Court provided the peti-
47. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
48. Id. at 345.
49. Id. at 346–48.
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tioner with relief on terms that generated a federal law hook for fu-
ture defendants who quickly saw the potential for achieving favorable
fifty-state tort reform through the invocation of the cherished consti-
tutional value of free speech.  Any remnant of Erie’s concern regard-
ing the proper place for the federal courts was lost in the ensuing
revolution.  Although it is by no means inconsistent with the spirit of
Erie for the Court to reverse outlier decisions that raise serious consti-
tutional concerns, it is quite another thing for the Court to treat the
Constitution as empowering it to rework entirely a body of tort doc-
trine so that it better accords with the Justices’ sensibilities about what
a modern body of defamation law ought to look like.
III. PREEMPTION: FROM CIPOLLONE TO GEIER AND BEYOND
Our expressions of concern regarding the degree to which the Court
has meddled with defamation law might seem overblown.  Many
would suppose that libel and slander lie at the periphery of modern
tort law.  Even if the Court has overreached in this area, they might
say, this is hardly something to get up in arms about.
Complacency of this sort is unwarranted for several reasons.  First,
it is symptomatic of the very transformation wrought by the Court
that we have identified as problematic.  Second, one would have to
know more about how the Court’s massive reworking of defamation
and privacy law has affected public and private life before concluding
that the Court’s work in those areas was harmless.  Third, and most
importantly, Sullivan set a pattern of court intervention that has since
repeated itself.  The Court’s tussle with the Alabama Supreme Court
in Sullivan, of course, largely replicated itself in BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore,50 and, from there, a national law of punitive
damages has emerged.  Likewise, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,51 the Court’s worry over proof of causation in
toxic tort cases quickly extended to a general insistence that expert
testimony—even on relatively prosaic matters in tort litigation—meet
heightened standards of reliability.52  In each instance, federal law
provided a hook: the First Amendment in Sullivan, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause in BMW, and the Federal Rules of
Evidence in Daubert.  In each case, defendants thoughtfully packaged
a federal issue that was intermingled with a state-law tort claim and
persuaded the Court that something had gone very seriously wrong in
50. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
51. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
52. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (holding that the Daubert standard
applies to all forms of expert testimony).
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the courts below, such that the Court’s attention was warranted.  And,
as to each, defense lawyers followed their victory in an initial
landmark case with years of advocacy that resulted in revisions of tort
law far beyond those achieved in the initial decision.
Perhaps the most timely and important example of this phenome-
non involves the evolution of federal preemption doctrine.  In this do-
main, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.53 is the Court’s key decision.
Although hardly on par with Sullivan as a landmark of modern law,
Cipollone turns out to bear important similarities to that decision.
Like Sullivan, Cipollone involved a tort suit with significant political
implications.  Because of the substantial political and economic clout
of tobacco companies, especially in certain regions, Congress faced a
daunting task in regulating tobacco products.  Thus, it was not until
decades after the dangers of smoking were first documented that—in
the face of the famous Surgeon General’s report and the efforts of
nontobacco states and the Federal Trade Commission to regulate ciga-
rettes—Congress required manufacturers to put warning labels on cig-
arette packages.  The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
of 1965 (1965 Act) was a compromise of sorts.54  Cigarette packages
were required to display a particular warning: “CAUTION: CIGA-
RETTE SMOKING MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO YOUR
HEALTH.”55  In return, however, the 1965 Act included an express
preemption clause providing that no other “statement” relating to
smoking and health could be “required” of cigarette manufacturers.56
The 1965 Act included a sunset clause, so Congress returned to to-
bacco safety in 1969.  The Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
1969 (1969 Act)57 required cigarette packages to adopt the starker
warning that smoking is hazardous to health.58  But, it also contained
a more elaborate preemption clause—Section 5(b).59  That section
reads as follows: “No requirement or prohibition based on smoking
and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the adver-
tising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are la-
beled in conformity with the provisions of this [Act].”60
In 1983, Rose Cipollone, a smoker who suffered from terminal lung
cancer, and her husband Anthony sued three cigarette manufactur-
53. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
54. Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–41 (2012)).
55. Id. § 4 (emphasis added).
56. Id. § 5.
57. Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–41 (2012)).
58. Id. § 4.
59. Id. § 5(b).
60. Id. (emphasis added).
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ers.61  The suit included claims for design defect, failure to warn, ex-
press warranty, fraud, and conspiracy.62  After Rose died, Anthony
took over her claim as executor of her estate and also asserted a claim
on his own behalf for loss of consortium.63  Both Rose’s and
Anthony’s claims generated a verdict holding the defendants liable for
failure to warn and for breach of express warranty.64  However, the
jury assigned Rose 80% comparative fault, which negated any recov-
ery by her or Anthony on the failure-to-warn claim.65  Oddly, as to the
express warranty claims, the jury awarded Rose no damages but
awarded Anthony $400,000.66  Anthony died after the trial, and their
son, Thomas, took over both claims.67  The defendants appealed, argu-
ing that all claims were preempted by the 1965 and 1969 Acts.68
The Court eventually rendered a fractured decision that gave ciga-
rette manufacturers only a modest victory.  A plurality—Justice Ste-
vens joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice
O’Connor—concluded that the 1969 Act (but not the 1965 Act) pre-
empted failure-to-warn claims, at least insofar as these claims were
premised on the idea that manufacturers could be deemed to have
acted tortiously by not providing warnings on packages or in adver-
tisements beyond those mandated by the 1969 Act.  The same plural-
ity opinion further concluded that the plaintiffs’ remaining claims
were not preempted.69
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Souter and Justice Kennedy,
concluded that none of the plaintiffs’ claims were preempted by either
Act.70  This resulted in a seven-Justice majority ruling of no preemp-
tion with respect to the plaintiffs’ warranty, fraud, and conspiracy
61. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 509 (1992).
62. Id. at 512.
63. Id. at 509.
64. Id. at 512.  The plaintiffs’ design defect claims were dismissed by the trial court and were
not addressed in the Supreme Court’s preemption analysis.
65. Id.
66. The trial court concluded that the jury’s failure to award Rose damages for her warranty
claim was clearly erroneous but nonetheless declined to cure the error because plaintiffs’ counsel
had sought relief by means of a motion for a partial new trial that was limited to damages only.
The trial court denied the motion because it concluded that a retrial of the damages issue would
require retrial of certain liability issues, hence making a partial retrial impossible.  The trial court
also ruled that the defendants had failed to properly raise comparative fault as a defense to the
plaintiffs’ warranty claims.  Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 693 F. Supp. 208, 216–217 (D.N.J.
1988), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 505 U.S.
504.
67. Id.
68. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 510.
69. Id. at 517–20 (plurality opinion).
70. Id. at 531 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting
in part).
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claims.  Meanwhile, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas took the view
that each of the plaintiffs’ claims was preempted under both the 1965
and 1969 Acts.71  They thereby provided the votes necessary to garner
a six-Justice majority for the proposition that the plaintiffs’ failure-to-
warn claims were preempted by the 1969 Act.  The upshot was that
litigants suing tobacco companies for tobacco-related illnesses could
proceed with express warranty, fraud, and conspiracy claims but not
with claims based on inadequate warnings in labeling or advertising.
The subtle split between Justices Stevens and Blackmun turned on
their respective views of whether a state court judgment deeming a
cigarette manufacturer liable under the common law of tort for failing
adequately to warn a smoker of smoking-related dangers amounted to
a “requirement or prohibition . . . imposed under State law” within the
meaning of Section 5(b) of the 1969 Act.72  Justice Blackmun argued
that common law tort liability is quite different in legal form from
state regulations and statutes, and that this difference meant that a
tort judgment could not be understood as setting a “requirement or
prohibition.”73  A holding of preemption was thus unwarranted, espe-
cially in light of the presumption against preemption, which Justice
Stevens was himself fond of emphasizing.
Facing a creative legal argument by the tobacco companies rooted
in the Court’s labor preemption cases, Justice Stevens agreed that
common law tort claims were not preempted by the 1965 Act.74  And,
he agreed with Justice Blackmun that it would be insufficiently atten-
tive to federalism concerns if the Court were to read the 1969 Act,
which, like its predecessor, was overwhelmingly addressed to state
regulation, to preempt all of the Cipollones’ claims.  But, on the pre-
cise issue of the relation between the 1969 Act and the failure-to-warn
claim, Justice Stevens was willing to find preemption.75  This was, in
significant part, because he read Section 5(b)’s emphasis on “advertis-
ing and promotion” as indicating a decision by Congress to go beyond
the 1965 Act in making sure that manufacturers received the full ben-
efit of the political bargain that resulted in their being mandated to
adopt stronger warning language.76
71. Id. at 555–56 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part).
72. See Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, § 5(b), Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2012)).
73. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 536 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in
part, and dissenting in part).
74. Id. at 535 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting
in part).
75. Id. at 524 (plurality opinion).
76. See id. at 524–25 (plurality opinion).
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Justice Scalia’s disagreement with Justice Stevens was similarly
rooted in a difference of opinion on how to interpret the express pre-
emption clauses of the two statutes.  First, Justice Scalia rejected the
assertion that the historical presumption against preemption was ap-
plicable when Congress includes an express preemption provision in
the relevant statute.77  Then, adopting a Holmesian view of law as a
threat of official sanction (whether in the form of a regulatory fine or
tort liability), Justice Scalia deemed tort liability to be the imposition
of a state law requirement on cigarette manufacturers.78
As noted, Cipollone and Sullivan differ in many ways.  The former
was a personal injury claim for compensatory damages while the latter
was not.  The Court lacked a majority opinion in Cipollone but was
unanimous in Sullivan (at least with respect to the proposition that a
public official who cannot prove actual malice may not recover).  Al-
though both cases challenged state tort law in a manner that ulti-
mately rested on the Constitution, Cipollone involved the power-
sharing relationship between the federal and state governments while
Sullivan involved an enumerated individual right.  And, of course, the
tobacco company defendants in Cipollone obtained nothing like the
complete victory that had been obtained by the New York Times.
Yet these two cases also have important commonalities.  In Cipol-
lone, as in Sullivan, the Court felt compelled to modify rules of tort
law to prevent tort litigation from undermining or evading a settle-
ment achieved at the level of national politics.  In Sullivan, the Court
blocked southern political officials’ uses of defamation law as a rear-
guard action against federally mandated desegregation.  In Cipollone,
a majority thought it was important to block the use of failure-to-warn
claims to undermine the resolution of a hard-fought national political
battle.  The case for intervention in Sullivan was bolstered by broad
national support for desegregation as well as a coalescence in mid-
twentieth century constitutional thought around an understanding of
the First Amendment as first and foremost denying governments the
power to punish political speech.  Obviously, the case for intervention
in Cipollone could not purport to tap into fundamental values of this
sort.  Nonetheless, there was a political background to which the
Court could look for support.  The settlement brokered in Congress
was achieved at a very fine-grained level—it is not often that one finds
directives in federal legislation (as opposed to federal regulation) that
operate at the level of specificity of the mandated warnings contained
77. Id. at 546 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
78. Id. at 554–55 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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in the 1965 and 1969 Acts.  Moreover, through Section 5(b) of the
1969 Act, Congress incorporated a relatively explicit understanding of
how the settlement was to be implemented within the tiers of the U.S.
federal system.  In short, it was clearly a term of the political bargain:
as long as manufacturers complied with federally mandated warnings,
they would be protected against state-law pressures to adopt addi-
tional warnings.
As in Sullivan, the Cipollone Court did not enter the fray based on
any a priori belief of how failure-to-warn tort litigation should work
anymore than it exercised and aimed its power in Sullivan to craft
libel law.  The Court’s challenge in Cipollone, as in Sullivan, was ex-
trinsic to tort law.  Lawyers for tobacco companies used federal pre-
emption doctrine and extant federal regulatory legislation as a way to
limit their exposure to tort liability.  But, of course, the defense bar’s
enchantment with federal preemption did not turn out to be a one-
night stand.  And, just as Sullivan marked the first step in what would
become decades of increasingly intrusive doctrinal development, Ci-
pollone marked the first small step in what has since become an elabo-
rate and, indeed, transformative use by the Court of the doctrine of
federal preemption.
One need only glance at subsequent preemption decisions, starting
with the Court’s 2000 decision in Geier v. American Honda Motor
Co.,79 to gauge the distance the Court has travelled from Cipollone
and to see why the trajectory of modern preemption jurisprudence
raises serious concerns regarding the Court’s faithfulness to the spirit
of Erie.  In Geier, the plaintiff was injured in a car crash and sued
Honda, the manufacturer of her 1987 model-year car.  Brought under
Washington, D.C. law, the suit alleged that the car was negligently and
defectively designed because it did not have a driver’s side airbag.80
Justice Breyer, writing for a bare majority, concluded that the plain-
tiff’s claim was preempted by a regulation—Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standards and Regulations Standard No. 208 (FMVSS 208)81—
that had been adopted in 1984 by the U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion (DOT).  FMVSS 208 allowed car manufacturers to phase in dif-
ferent safety devices into different model-year vehicles between 1984
and 1989.82  According to Geier, a decision to allow the plaintiff to
recover would be tantamount to allowing the District of Columbia to
require all 1987 model cars sold in D.C. to be equipped with airbags,
79. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
80. Id. at 865.
81. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (2013).
82. Geier, 529 U.S. at 885–86.
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thereby undermining DOT’s decision to grant manufacturers room in
the late 1980s to choose among different safety devices.83
The most arresting feature of Geier is the Court’s self-aggrandizing
reading of the federal statute under which DOT had issued FMVSS
208.  Like the federal cigarette labeling laws, the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (NTMVSA)84 contains a preemp-
tion provision.  Thus, according to NTMVSA Section 1392(d), once
DOT duly establishes a safety standard with respect to a motor vehi-
cle, “no State . . . shall have any authority . . . to establish, or to con-
tinue in effect, . . . any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of
performance of such vehicle . . . which is not identical to the Federal
standard.”85  Taken on its own, this provision might seem to raise the
question as to whether the imposition of tort liability on a car manu-
facturer for an alleged defect would amount to the “establish[ment]”
or “continu[ation] in effect” of a state vehicle safety “standard.”
However, Section 1392(d) cannot be taken on its own.  Indeed, Con-
gress seemingly spared courts the need to address this question by
answering it.  For, alongside its express preemption provision,
NTMVSA contains an express savings clause.  And that clause, Sec-
tion 1397(k), quite clearly states that “compliance with” a federal
safety standard “does not exempt any person from any liability under
common law.”86
Section 1397(k)’s unambiguous language quite clearly indicates that
Congress did not mean for a manufacturer’s compliance with DOT
safety regulations to establish a complete defense to tort actions.  In-
stead, evidence of compliance would be admissible on the question of
whether a manufacturer exercised due care or adopted an acceptable
design.  It was hardly surprising that Congress adopted this under-
standing of the relationship of regulatory law to tort law.  The default
common law rule has long been that compliance with state safety laws
and regulations is relevant to, but not dispositive of, tort liability.  By
including Section 1397(k), Congress merely affirmed that the tradi-
tional approach would continue to apply in this context.  By contrast,
efforts by states to use their own regulatory agencies to impose con-
flicting standards on car manufacturers would be preempted.
Undaunted by statutory text, the traditional understanding of regu-
latory law as a floor not a ceiling, and the historic presumption against
83. See id. at 879.
84. Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
85. Geier, 529 U.S. at 867 (emphasis added) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988) (repealed
1994)).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1976) (repealed 1994) (emphasis added).
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preemption, the Geier majority found a way to deem Geier’s common
law tort claim preempted.  Section 1397(k)’s savings clause, the Court
reasoned, meant that plaintiff’s claims were not preempted simply by
operation of Section 1392(d)’s express preemption clause.87  The en-
tire effect of Section 1397(k), in other words, was to cancel out Sec-
tion 1392(d) as it might otherwise have applied to tort claims.  This
left the Court with the task of determining for itself whether tort lia-
bility would so significantly interfere with the operation of federal reg-
ulations as to frustrate the purpose of Congress, thereby giving rise to
“implied” preemption even in the face of the statute’s savings clause.88
Whatever might be said about the validity of implied preemption
analysis when a federal statute is silent as to its preemptive effect,
Geier’s assertion of the authority to find implied preemption in the
face of an express savings clause is extremely aggressive.  If Erie was
remarkable for its abandonment of lawmaking power, Geier is no less
remarkable for its assertion of this power.  Indeed, Geier’s particular
application of implied preemption doctrine is barely distinguishable
from a claim to have authority to fashion general law.  The powerful
Geier dissent, penned by Justice Stevens on behalf of himself and
three colleagues, is no less striking.  For, notwithstanding its emphasis
on the presumption against preemption, it did not directly challenge
the majority’s questionable resort to implied preemption analysis.89
Instead, it argued, more weakly, that NTMVSA’s savings clause
should be understood to put a thumb on the scale against a finding of
implied preemption.90
From Geier we turn briefly to Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.91  In Riegel,
the Court deemed that negligence and products liability claims against
the manufacturer of a medical device (a balloon catheter) were pre-
empted on the ground that the device had been reviewed and ap-
proved by the federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
according to protocols set out in a federal statute known as the Medi-
cal Devices Amendments of 1976 (MDA).92  The MDA contains a
preemption provision that largely tracks the preemption provision of
the NTMVSA.  The clause bars states from establishing any require-
ments pertaining to the safety or effectiveness of a particular medical
device that differ from applicable federal requirements for that de-
87. Geier, 529 U.S. at 869–74.
88. See id. at 869.
89. See id. at 886–913 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90. See id. at 895–98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91. 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
92. Id. at 327–30. See generally Medical Devices Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90
Stat. 539 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
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vice.93  Because the device in question had been approved for sale
only after a safety review by the FDA, the Riegel Court—in an opin-
ion written by Justice Scalia—concluded that a finding of negligence
or design defect would amount to the establishment of state law “re-
quirements” pertaining to the safety of the device that were different
from the requirements set by the FDA as a condition for approval.94
Accordingly, it deemed the plaintiff’s tort claims preempted.95
In some respects, the Court was less aggressive in finding preemp-
tion in Riegel than it was in Geier.  For one thing, there was no savings
clause in the MDA and, for another, Riegel depended on express
rather than implied preemption.  But Riegel was aggressive in other
ways.  Its sweep is enormous: it cuts off all design defect claims by an
injured plaintiff against the manufacturer of a medical device that has
cleared the FDA’s full approval process.  And, its justification de-
pends on an interpretation of the MDA’s preemption clause that,
while colorable, is quite artificial.  As Justice Ginsburg’s dissent
demonstrated, the FDA, under the authority of the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA),96 had, for decades, operated a pre-approval
program for drugs that involved review comparable to full review of
medical devices under the MDA.97  Yet, there had never been any
suggestion that the FDA’s preapproval process for drugs immunized
drug manufacturers from tort liability.  Quite the opposite; a drug
manufacturer’s compliance with FDA requirements was understood
on the traditional floor-not-ceiling terms—as relevant to, but not dis-
positive of, issues such as negligence and design defect.  To be sure,
the FDCA, unlike the MDA, contained no express preemption provi-
sion.  But, it is fairly clear that Congress added that provision to the
MDA not to cut off state tort law claims but, rather, to fend off the
emergence of state regulatory regimes for medical devices.98
Thus, in Riegel, too, one sees that the Court now understands itself
as commissioned by the Supremacy Clause to search out and eliminate
tort liability that it regards as too greatly interfering with the opera-
tion of federal regulations.  This might be a defensible assignment for
the Court to give itself with respect to tort doctrines that actually in-
hibit or prevent agencies, such as the DOT and the FDA, from per-
forming their statutory duties.  But, there is little, if any, evidence of
93. Medical Devices Amendments § 521.
94. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 321–23.
95. Id. at 330.
96. Ch. 649, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
97. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 339 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 341 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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interference of this sort in Geier or Riegel.  Rather, the interference is
described abstractly as a frustration of Congress’s broader regulatory
purposes.  In any event, the majorities in these decisions seemed less
concerned for the plight of federal regulators and more concerned
with the plight of regulated entities who have supposedly been placed
in a difficult or unfair position by having to comply with both federal
regulatory law and state tort law.  Yet, as noted above, actors subject
to overlapping regulatory and tort law have always faced this situa-
tion.  It is only quite recently that anyone has thought it to be
untenable.99
If Riegel’s recognition of de facto immunity for medical device man-
ufacturers was close to a fabrication, why was it a nearly unanimous
decision and why has it received so little scholarly criticism?  Part of
the answer, we believe, takes us back to an issue that was central to
Cipollone.  Recall that Justices Stevens, Blackmun, and Scalia battled
over whether the existence of state common law products liability
doctrines amount to a “requirement” set by state law.100  Justice
Blackmun had reasoned that state tort law does not set requirements
and, thus, could not be preempted by either the 1965 or 1969 Acts.
Justice Stevens had concluded that some tort rules set requirements
(and hence were preempted) whereas others did not. Justice Scalia,
meanwhile, had asserted that all forms of tort liability at issue in Ci-
pollone constitute requirements and hence all should have been
deemed preempted.
Just four years after Cipollone, Justice Scalia’s position had gone
from attracting only one colleague (Justice Thomas) to being the ma-
jority view.  In a precursor to Riegel—the Court’s 1996 decision in
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr101—a divided Court concluded that the MDA
did not preempt liability for injuries caused by medical devices that
receive only cursory FDA review prior to being approved for sale to
the public.102  Justice O’Connor, writing a dissenting opinion for her-
self and Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, asserted: “Whether
relating to the labeling of cigarettes or the manufacture of medical
devices, state common-law damages actions operate to require manu-
facturers to comply with common-law duties.”103  Given that, on this
view, “state common-law damages actions do impose ‘require-
ments[,]’” it followed that any tort liability imposed for injuries
99. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. R
100. See supra notes 61–78 and accompanying text (discussing Cipollone).
101. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
102. Id. at 501–03.
103. Id. at 510 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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caused by FDA-approved devices, no matter how cursory the FDA’s
review, must be preempted.104  Meanwhile, although he joined the
majority in rejecting the defendant’s preemption argument, Justice
Breyer, in his concurring opinion, accepted this aspect of Justice
O’Connor’s analysis.105  In short, by 1996—with Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justice O’Connor having moved from the qualified position
expressed in Justice Stevens’ Cipollone plurality opinion to the absolu-
tist position staked out by Justice Scalia’s Cipollone dissent (joined by
Justice Thomas) and with Justice Breyer having replaced Justice
Blackmun—a majority had accepted the absolutist approach.  Indeed,
Justice Stevens would later virtually concede this point in his ambiva-
lent concurring opinion in Riegel.106
As scholars who have argued against the view that tort law is
merely a collection of liability rules and who have instead insisted that
tort law—including many versions of the law of “strict” products lia-
bility—sets genuine duties of conduct, we might seem ill-suited to re-
ject the view that tort law can set “requirements.”  Yet, we do reject
that view, and for good reason.  The question at hand in tort preemp-
tion cases is how one should understand Congress’s declaration that
inconsistent state requirements are preempted.  On that issue, we
think it overwhelmingly clear that even though tort liability does hold
defendants accountable for breaches of genuine obligations, Congress,
in statutes such as the NTMVSA and the MDA, did not contemplate
that tort liability would count as a requirement or prohibition.  To say
the same thing: tort duties are requirements, but they are not the re-
quirements to which these statutes referred.  It is also more than a bit
ironic that Justice Scalia had no qualms anachronistically reading a
very modern, regulatory view of tort law into the language of statutes
adopted in an earlier time.  Finally, the broad Lohr–Riegel conception
of what counts as a requirement is especially inapt to a part of tort law
(products liability) that is notable for its embrace of strict liability.
The larger picture, however, is that even as to common law negli-
gence claims, the depiction of state tort law as containing require-
ments of a sort generating preemption is indefensible.  This depiction
relies on an equivocation between two different layers of duty within
the common law of torts.  When a jury reaches a plaintiff’s verdict in a
104. Id. at 509.
105. Id. at 503 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
106. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 332–33 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (footnote omitted) (“And although not all common-law rules qualify as
‘requirements,’ the Court correctly points out that five Justices in Lohr concluded that the com-
mon-law causes of action for negligence and strict liability at issue in that case imposed ‘require-
ments’ that were pre-empted by federal requirements specific to a medical device.”).
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negligence case and a court enters judgment on the verdict, the defen-
dant faces liability.  And, it is true that the state’s legal system has
seen fit to impose liability on the ground that—according to the jury—
the defendant breached a duty not to injure the plaintiff through a
certain kind of conduct.  However, the duty to refrain from negli-
gently injuring and the duty to take care exist at a level of generality
in state tort law that is entirely different from the obligation of the
defendant to pay the plaintiff once a judgment is entered.  For pre-
emption purposes, the question is whether the duty of conduct—the
duty to be careful as to the physical well-being of foreseeable vic-
tims—is preempted by federal law.  The fact that a judge or jury in a
particular tort case has found that the defendant breached a duty of
care by injuring the plaintiff is quite distinct from a state legislature or
regulatory body declaring that certain conduct is prohibited or re-
quired.  Likewise, a state’s maintenance of laws, through which an ac-
tor can be held liable to provide redress to an injury-victim on the
basis of certain findings, is a far cry from state regulation.
The Court has come a long way since Cipollone.  By recognizing
various different forms of preemption—express preemption, frustra-
tion-of-purpose preemption, impossibility preemption, and occupa-
tion-of-the-field preemption—it has given repeat-player products
liability defendants vast protections from state law tort liability.  In
2016, a plaintiff’s rights to recover damages in a products liability ac-
tion under common law are greatly diminished from what they were in
the early 1990s.  Through the doctrine of preemption, the Supreme
Court has now effectively immunized the manufacturers of generic
drugs—over 75% of the market for drugs in 2009—from products lia-
bility claims.107  The same is true with respect to manufacturers of
medical devices that go through the FDA’s full preclearance proce-
dures.  Promising preemption arguments are open to manufacturers in
a wide variety of areas in which Congress has never passed any sort of
regulatory statute, let alone one with a preemption clause.  And, we
are not even mentioning the additional limitations that the Court’s
Daubert and punitive damages decisions have imposed on state prod-
ucts liability law.
Preemption is now front and center in modern tort law because the
Court did not let Cipollone stand as a one-off reading of a particular
statute.  Instead, the Court has granted certiorari in dozens of cases
since, and it is has gradually moved, albeit inconstantly, in a direction
that is as hostile to negligence and products liability plaintiffs as it is to
107. Pliva v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2584 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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libel plaintiffs.  In these areas of tort law, as in libel law, Erie now
tends to be honored in the breach.
IV. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding their many differences, the Supreme Court’s defa-
mation and preemption decisions have traveled down a similar path.
Called on to intervene on behalf of defendants with a compelling
claim to protection from a certain kind of liability, the Court granted
relief on terms that inevitably invited further petitions, which, in turn,
gave rise to a body of federal law that has largely displaced applicable
tort law.
Sullivan offered a particular and readily justified holding: officials
may not use civil defamation law to bring seditious libel prosecutions.
However, because that decision was framed by the Court as raising a
deep conflict between the right of free speech and defamation law, it
quickly gave rise to a general law of defamation.  The supposed vul-
nerability of speech to the “chilling effect” of tort liability would be-
come an argument that few Justices have been able to resist.
Cipollone was a cautious decision.  Given two federal statutes that
not only contained preemption clauses (and no savings clauses), but
also mandated a highly specific warning about the dangers of smoking,
the Court concluded that tort plaintiffs suing tobacco companies, al-
though free to pursue various theories of wrongful injury, were barred
from pursuing the particular theory that cigarette advertisements and
packages had inadequately warned them of smoking’s dangers.
Again, however, lurking in a narrow decision was the basis for a much
broader assault on tort law.  For once tort law was understood as, at
least on some occasions, setting “requirements,” it only took a short
step to conclude that state tort law, in general, makes demands on
regulated entities incompatible with those of the federal regulatory
state.
Because in each case there was a constitutional basis for the Court’s
intervention, the Justices can, with a straight face, claim not to have
abandoned Erie.  But, by framing the constitutional concerns raised
by these cases at a high level of generality and by assigning themselves
the task of addressing these concerns wherever they arise, the Court
went a long way toward fashioning its own federal tort law of libel and
products liability.  As briefly suggested above, we believe that parallel
stories can be told about the emergence of a federal tort law of pri-
vacy, punitive damages, causation in toxic tort cases, and elsewhere.108
108. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. R
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It has long been the job of state courts to establish common law
rules that govern interactions between and among private parties and
to define our rights and duties in relation to one another.  In some
cases, the application of these rules raises pressing issues pertaining to
the relationship between states and citizens, such that it would blinker
reality to treat those cases as merely raising matters of private law.
This was true in Sullivan and Cipollone.  It hardly follows that private
law always, or even usually, runs afoul of public law or that the Court
should be looking for excuses to revise extant state private law with
new rules that it believes are more consonant with public law
frameworks and values.  The line between public law that regulates
and private law that redresses wrongs is not always sharp.  Still, the
two are by no means one and the same thing.  Whenever it finds itself
making doctrine in the heartland of torts, the Court should recognize
that it is likely homogenizing, distorting, and federalizing a body of
state law to which individuals are entitled as a matter of common law
and as a matter of right.
